Abstract: Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) represent the introduction of financialization into the social sector as they reframe problems into financial opportunities for investors, who provide upfront capital for service projects with the promise of a profit if they achieve social impact. Despite a lack of evidence that they improve social outcomes and save public money, SIBs are becoming increasingly popular in Canada. Understanding this quandary guides our research, which consists of an interpretive analysis of both Canadian and international documents and literature on SIBs. Unlike the bulk of the writing on SIBs, we conceptualize the tool as a political rather than a neutral and technical policy object popularized in a context where the politics of austerity has been dominant. We examine how agents in Canada and abroad have coalesced a unique and conflicting array of political projects, including neoliberalism, managerialism, anti-statism, and communitarianism, to acquire support for the tool. Using literature on citizenship, the paper answers two questions: What notions of citizenship do the political projects behind SIBs evoke and how have these projects contributed to increasing support for the tool in Canada? What are the implications of the reconfiguration of citizenship through SIBs? We argue that dominant political projects behind SIBs narrow citizenship, depoliticize social services, and de-radicalize civil society. However, tensions associated with this political work may create the conditions for alternative political projects that demand a more expansive concept of social citizenship, social policy, and civil society and we seek to identify these transformative spaces.

Abstract: As many commentators have noted, neoliberalism in Canada has involved the deliberate shifting of responsibility to the voluntary sector. For example, deduction limits for registered charities were raised from 20 per cent of income to 50 per cent in 1995, and then to 75 per cent of income in 1996. In this context of a growing competition for charitable donations, there are clear questions of who wins when the state steps aside, and why? My paper will empirically examine such questions by looking at the evolving revenue structure for charitable organizations between 1990 and 2014. In particular, the paper will draw on Nitzan and Bichler’s “capital as power” approach to political economy, which focuses on the way “dominant capital” (in this case, ‘big charity’) uses institutional factors like size, strategic connections and advertising to retain and augment its own power. Contrary to the significant body of literature on the ethics of philanthropy, which tries to provide tools for donors inform themselves about charities so they can donate wisely, the paper will show that neoliberalism's more encouraging context for charitable organizations has meant an increasingly oligopolistic non-profit marketplace.

Abstract: Although embraced by investor-oriented firms, independence requirements may pose significant issues for co-operatives. Given that most directors are customers or suppliers of their co-operative, they are not financially independent from the organization. Moreover, specifying that candidates for directorship elections must be independent, or “outsiders”, may be contrary to co-operative democratic principles. The concern is that, without being chosen by members, independent directors will lack legitimacy. This, combined with a belief that outside directors are disconnected from their organization (including its mission and its principles), gives rise to fears that co-operatives will follow a corporate, rather than community, logic. This distinction is important, because community logic is what allows co-operatives to pursue goals other than profit-maximization. The issue is that co-operatives are being expected to adopt governance measures, that although appropriate for investor-oriented firms, may be inappropriate for mission-oriented organizations. Through interviews with key individuals in Canadian co-operatives and credit unions – including executive directors, board members, membership officers, and corporate secretaries – this paper explores the governance issues these organizations face in trying to meet mandates for independent directors. An examination of whether independence will impact co-operatives the same way it does investor-owned firms is also offered. Co-operatives are an important part of Canada’s economy, yet they are often overlooked by academics, policy makers, and the wider public. This paper is an attempt to highlight one of the problems co-operatives experience as they struggle to meet ‘corporate’ governance demands while, at the same time, maintaining their social objectives.