Abstract: The concept of forgiveness is omnipresent in the literature on transitional justice and reconciliation – yet its invocation in the sphere of politics has been marked by conceptual inconsistency and imprecision. There is considerable equivocation on the term, glossing moral, theological, therapeutic, and legal aspects and applications, while arguments about its political potential proceed through political, apolitical, and even antipolitical premises. In these debates over the political application and even appropriateness of forgiveness, many writers openly reference Hannah Arendt, and it has even been suggested that her work is partly responsible for introducing the idea into political discourse (Young-Bruehl 2006). In the decades since Arendt formulated her unique conception, there has been a remarkable international proliferation of political processes dedicated to cultivating forgiveness, with the contemporary praxis explicitly linked to postwar tribunals and reconciliation processes in at least ten countries. These formulations have also drawn sharp criticism, though, particularly for their negative implications for the relationship between the state and victims of state-authored injustice. This paper explores some of these criticisms in light of the Canadian truth and reconciliation process, and proposes a ‘return to the source’ in order to clarify the debate on forgiveness in politics. Drawing from a range of Arendt’s published and unpublished works, we challenge the increasingly popular academic claim that forgiveness has no place in politics by outlining an interpretation that addresses the more common critiques while presenting an alternative way of thinking about ‘forgiveness-in-reconciliation’ in the contemporary Canadian context.

Abstract: "At this time, eight provinces and one territory have adopted ""apology legislation"" and there is increasing demand from various organizations to have all provinces and territories enact apology acts and to educate physicians about the act in jurisdictions which have already done so. While apology act legislation is itself fairly straightforward its potential meaning and impact is much more complex. What does it tell us about our collective notions of responsibility and accountability? Is apology legislation an outlier in current principles of public policy and administration or does it signal a larger shift in our understandings of citizenship practice? What is the potential impact of apology for those who receive and offer them? This paper will consider these questions by examining apology legislation from an ethics of care perspective. Does apology legislation signify a meaningful shift regarding how we think through care in public policy? Does it work to integrate care ethics into medical policy and if so does it signal an opportunity to reconsider care as citizenship practice?"

Abstract: "Despite its ubiquitous status, few philosophical concepts have been as mercurial as the concept “freedom.” In liberal theory it has tended to be considered the inalienable property of the individual, while in more intersubjective accounts (like Fichte, Hegel and Marx) it becomes a social concept. For some philosophers (as diverse as Rousseau, Kant and Heidegger) it has implied aligning oneself with an external or prior principle - like the general will, the Law, or one’s lifeworld - while for others (Mill, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Sartre) freedom is reserved for those (often rare) moments where one is able to break free from the static world of representation, institutions and social conventions. In this paper I will call into question the status that “freedom” has occupied in the history of political philosophy. Following a certain reading of Emmanuel Levinas I will argue that neither liberal nor traditional intersubjective accounts of freedom can adequately express the singularity and importance of the individual. Instead we must shift to a view of intersubjectivity which privileges the other over the self (both analytically and normatively). This asymmetrical view of subjectivity rejects the atomism of liberalism as well as any attempt to establish the priority of the collective over the individual. Paradoxically, I claim, if we want to create the political conditions for true individuality we must abandon our conceptions of freedom in favour of a robust notion of responsibility."