Abstract: Given the irreducible nature of political conflict in pluralistic societies and existing power imbalances, we must walk the rough ground of politics in our ongoing efforts to reformulate constitutional essentials in more legitimate ways rather than surrendering to any approach – liberal or otherwise – that relies on might equalling right. This demands pursuing a very different political project and normative line of reasoning than the one liberal multiculturalism proposes of finding a counterfactual justification for imposing an ideal-theoretic framework as legitimate on all ‘reasonable’ citizens. It will also be shown to differ subtly from a theoretical project endorsed by leading Canadian theorists that suggests that, once we abandon top-down approaches, our collective quest should focus on finding and establishing civic virtues that can legitimately guide fundamental disagreements towards more democratic and more consensual constitutional frameworks rather than force ‘agreement’ once and for all. Some talk of establishing “peace, friendship, and respect” (M. Williams 2006) or “mutual recognition, continuity and consent” (Tully 1995). Though powerful virtues, their defenders cannot but contend with the rough political ground that must be crossed in the political struggle to implement them in the service of more legitimate constitutional frameworks. Thus, this chapter centrally argues instead for the priority of critically examining and continually asking the dynamic, daily, and immensely difficult question of ‘where to begin’ tackling hegemonic relations head on rather than rushing to any answer of what it might ideally look like after such relations have been drastically tamed or overcome.

Paper / Communication

Abstract: In this paper I approach the topic of political obligation in a somewhat different way than is usually done in the literature. I examine the problem of political obligation in light of a particular set of cases – Indigenous populations in settler states. Specifically, I explore how the structure of the contemporary scholarship on political obligation impedes our ability to come up with a compelling argument for Indigenous political obligations. In the first part of the paper I illustrate how the standard construction of the problem of political obligation changes when the analytical focus is narrowed to consider the specific case of Indigenous peoples. Where the standard frame calls for a justificatory account that would satisfy a person as an individual citizen and that would successfully meet the anarchist’s challenge, the Indigenous case calls for a justificatory account that would satisfy Indigenous people as members of Indigenous communities and as people who have experienced the wrongs associated with settler state colonialism. In the second part of the paper I examine three popular accounts of political obligation (i.e., the fair play, natural duty and consent-based accounts) in order to assess their usefulness in terms of making the case that Indigenous political obligations exist. The analysis advances that the fair play and natural duty accounts are of very little use given the stated goal. By contrast, the analysis of consent-based accounts shows that the principle of consent could ground a satisfactory case for Indigenous political obligations.

Abstract: "The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada has called for a Royal Proclamation of Reconciliation that reaffirms the nation-to-nation relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown. It also calls for church parties to respect Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination in spiritual matters. The Commission calls for the repudiation of concepts used to justify European sovereignty over Indigenous lands and people, changes to school curriculum, and training in intercultural competency for public servants. This path to reconciliation can be facilitated and informed by Charles Taylor’s account of intercultural communication, itself animated by the Gadamerian concept of the ‘fusion of horizons’. Taylor’s hermeneutic approach in works like The Malaise of Modernity and “Comparison, History, Truth,” seeks intersubjective recognition and understanding to overcome cultural incommensurability. Taylor’s approach should be supplemented by Hannah Arendt’s account of political judgment, which operates as a guideline for intersubjective public deliberation. Arendt’s respect for plurality, her agonistic conception of politics, and her invitation to deliberators to “go visiting” the perspectives of others make her account of communicative political action a valuable counterpoint to Taylor. It helps to ensure that in the intercultural communicative processes of reconciliation, citizens do not assume that the final purpose is an ultimate convergence of values, but rather a respectful recognition of difference and intersection. Arendt offers an important criticism of the politics of recognition, helping us to overcome the colonial modes of recognition that expect or command a particular set of ways of being, acting,"

Paper / Communication

Abstract: This paper examines how Aboriginal and Asian-Canadian group experiences were recognized through permanent and temporary exhibitions at the Canadian Museum of Civilization (now the Canadian Museum of History) from the Museum’s opening in 1989 to the completion of its last permanent exhibit in 2003, in the context of increased attention to and sophistication in thinking about the politics of recognition arising around the same time. It investigates, in particular, how museum officials consult minority group representatives when constructing exhibits and the influences of such consultations. It draws an analogy between the tensions group representatives and museum officials navigated in these cases and the tensions that trouble all efforts to recognize difference through law. In particular, it argues that these dynamics highlight the difficulty of full fidelity to the goals of self-definition and recognition in the face of financial, time, and other resource constraints. It suggests that understanding demands for recognition as, at least in part, demands for self-definition can help guide legal approaches to the recognition of difference, and that this analogy helps show some relevant constraints. This paper is part of a larger project that argues that the value of self-definition may be helpful for guiding legal responses to the politics of recognition.