Political Theory

Session: H4(b) - Deconsolidation Panels: Populism and Democracy

Date: May 30, 2017 | Time: 01:30pm to 03:00pm | Location: VIC-609 (Victoria Building)| iOS / Outlook

Chair/Présidente: Laurie Naranch (Siena College)

Discussant/Commentateur: Ronald Beiner (University of Toronto at Mississauga)

Participants & Authors/Auteurs:

John Grant (King's University College) : Paths to Revolution: On Populist Democracy and Constituent Power
Abstract: This paper begins with a perplexing reality: studies of populism rarely mention constituent power despite its relevance to what populists say, while theorists of constituent power rarely mention populism, even though it seems like a form of politics open to embracing constituent power. Moreover, both regularly assert “the people” as their preferred subject of contentious politics. A comparative account is required. First, however, I argue why critics of populism (e.g. Nadia Urbinati) and constituent power (e.g. David Dyzenhaus) are wrong to depict them as intrinsically unprincipled threats to democracy. Populism can be a legitimate (and potentially unavoidable) tool for reinvigorating democracy, while constituent power offers a way of challenging existing constitutional constraints without being anti-constitutional. Nor is fascism a probable outcome in either instance. Nevertheless, I articulate significant differences regarding the ontological assumptions typically made by populism and constituent power. These include the nature of political will; the construction of political subjects and identity; and the necessary kind of political rule. What are the consequences of these differences? As paths to revolution, I conclude that constituent power is much preferable insofar as (emancipatory) theory is concerned. But as for constituting an effective political force, it remains questionable whether the insights involving constituent power can ever match populism’s motivating power.

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Scott Dodds (University of Toronto) : “The Voice of Sacred Anger” and the Reply of Reason and Compassion: Rousseau’s Levite of Ephraim on the Passions and Public Speech
Abstract: In the increasing concern over the rise of populist and authoritarian movements in modern democracies many have noticed that the success of these movements depends upon powerful rhetorical speech that summons the passions of their supporters more effectively than the competing political speech of their opponents. These movements have a potent ability to appeal to anger, often at the expense of compassion and reason. Contemporary theories that focus on ideal speech situations or classical rhetoric seem distant from this dynamic. Instead, in my paper I turn to Rousseau’s Levite of Ephraim for its complicated analysis of both the necessity of political anger to enforce justice, as well as the possibilities for tempering and directing this anger with reason and compassion. Work on this fascinating writing of Rousseau’s has increased, but no one has yet offered an interpretation of it that demonstrates how it shows us central features of Rousseau’s thoughts on political discourse. Rousseau begins the prose poem by calling out “Sacred anger of virtue, come animate my voice” and his story throughout considers what passions and what sorts of signs and voices can (and should) furnish the basis for political community. By looking to a thinker with a broader view of public discourse than our own, we can begin to think through how to address the virulent passions of our contemporary situation.

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Aslan Amani (University of Toronto Mississauga) : The Radical Right Populist Visions of Democracy: An Illiberal Democracy or No Democracy at All?
Abstract: There is disagreement among students of populism about the extent to which populist ideals (especially its radical right variants) are compatible with the democratic ones. One commonly made argument is that populism is compatible with minimalist (electoral) democracy, albeit undermining democracy’s more substantively liberal variants. For instance, one prominent scholar of populism has called it an “illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism”. This article explores the link between populism and minimalist democracy. It argues that several principal populist ideas such as opposition to pluralism and appeals to the popular will tend to undermine not only liberal democratic norms of equal citizenship but also challenge the core minimalist commitments that make a stable electoral democracy possible. Using Joseph Schumpeter’s famous account of minimalist democracy as its point of departure, this article will analyze populism’s effect on three such minimalist commitments –competition, skepticism of allusions to the general will or the common good, and democracy’s regenerative dimension. I argue that minimalism even in its normatively thin, Schumpeterian variant does not lend credence to the views that assess populism as a democratic response to undemocratic liberalism. Moreover, as soon as one clarifies and espouses the normative underpinnings of these Schumpeterian commitments, the gap between radical right populism and minimalist democracy expands further.

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