Comparative Politics

B10 - Functional and Dysfunctional Checks and Balances

Date: Jun 3 | Time: 10:30am to 12:00pm | Location:

Chair/Président/Présidente : Samantha Twietmeyer (Queen's University)

Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Peter Miller (Brennan Center)

Media Populism in Serbia: Dejan Guzina (Wilfrid Laurier University)
Abstract: Political transformation in the post-socialist Serbia has largely taken the form of mimicry of genuine democratic processes in society. Such mimicry has effectively blocked the full emergence of genuinely independent liberal democratic institutions. Instead, they have been replaced by the quasi-independent subjects (a façade parliamentary system, and the loyal opposition parties) whose purpose is to provide the Serbian political regime with a semblance of legitimacy. This process is also characterized by the rise of illiberal values and practices, as well as the hollowing out of the nascent Serbian democratic institutions. The paper concentrates on the role of media in maintaining such a system. The first part of the paper explains the status of the media in society according to republican regulations and laws. It also emphasizes the formal and informal mechanisms of control of the Serbian media. The second part considers the consumers of the media messages and their social and cultural status. Finally, the content of the media messages is analyzed to highlight the mechanisms of simultaneously controlling and influencing Serbian citizens in their passive support for or the critique of the government and its policies. The paper draws on the textual analysis of the wide range of primary documents and secondary sources, as well as it incorporates insights from the in-depth interviews with some of the leading Serbian journalists.

Regulating Democracy: The Effects of Campaign Finance Regulation on Democratic Quality and Political Corruption: Michael Campbell (Carleton University)
Abstract: Evidence shows that corruption and democratic disaffection breed populism. The most recurrent form of political corruption in democracies is associated with campaign finance. In response to this, all democracies have implemented campaign finance regulation: rules controlling the collection and spending of campaign funds. However, there exists no consensus in the literature over which campaign finance regulations are most effective. This paper systematically analyzes the effects of different campaign finance regulations and regulatory strategies on levels of political corruption and the different dimensions of democratic quality, that is: confidence in electoral processes, and political participation, competition, and equality. Variation in the levels of these dependent variables affect public perceptions of democratic legitimacy. Therefore, the research question is: which campaign finance regulations, or regulatory strategies, decrease occurrences of political corruption and stimulate democratic quality? The analysis uses an original dataset that incorporates data from 42 democratic countries. Methodologically, it uses OLS regression to assess relationships between the independent and dependent variables. Factor analysis is utilized to generate and interpret different variations of campaign finance regulatory strategies – i.e. combinations of multiple individual regulations. This research links different forms of campaign finance regulation to various outcomes. I conclude that most political finance regulations either have no effect, or an overwhelmingly negative effect on the dependent variables. However, across countries, financial reporting requirements consistently decrease levels of political corruption, while also increasing levels in the dimensions of democratic quality. In turn, I identify reform measures that protect democracy against the rise of populist politicians.

A Constructive Development? Institutional Changes to Non-Confidence Rules in Comparative Perspective: Elsa Piersig (Carleton University)
Abstract: Parliamentary democracy is defined by the confidence connection between parliament and government, whereby the executive is formed out of and responsible to the people’s representatives. Despite the vote of non-confidence’s central role as an accountability mechanism for ensuring the confidence connection, it has garnered little scholarly attention in the Canadian and comparative parliamentary literatures. The literature is primarily limited to describing what the formal rules are and whether they foster parliamentary stability (Bergman 1993; De Winter, 1995; Bergman et al., 2003). The existing research conceives of four types delineated by two axes: 1) rules on deconstructing and/or constructing a new government (negative versus constructive rules), and 2) the type of majority required for a successful vote. However, this categorization does not account for the presence of other rules structuring the practical use of non-confidence votes. This paper develops a broader analysis to frame non-confidence rules within their institutional context by surveying the constitutional, parliamentary, and other institutional rules that influence the practical use of non-confidence votes. The institutional context includes the dissolution rules, parliamentary rules of procedure, rules or conventions governing cabinet and its relationship with the legislature, and investiture rules that come into play throughout the parliamentary term. The sample contains 29 established European and Westminster parliamentary democracies to capture variations across the institutional context of non-confidence rules. This research is part of a larger doctoral project that seeks to understand different types of non-confidence rules and their relationship with the role of parliament and democratic accountability.