H08 - Getting Politics Wrong: From Ignorance to Offence
Date: Jun 3 | Time: 08:45am to 10:15am | Location:
Chair/Président/Présidente : Peter Galambos (Sheridan College)
Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Emily Nacol (University of Toronto)
The Age of Absurdity – Political Praxis and the “Dirtbag” Left: Andrew Jones (York University)
Abstract: We are living within an Age of Absurdity in which the liberal-rational paradigm of Habermas’s discourse ethics no longer rings true. While facts have been less and less relevant within Anglosphere discourse since the invasion of Iraq, the absurdities of the Brexit and 2016 Presidential campaigns have made this impossible to ignore. This paper will first explore how humour and irony are used by the podcasts of the “Dirtbag Left” within North America to overcome the limitations of outrage politics and the assumption of reason and non-contradiction within political discourse. The podcasts of the “Dirtbag Left” adopt an ironic sense of cool, they are just as outraged at the absurdity of anglophone political discourse as the liberal pundits but embrace the ridiculous reality of media and hypernormality. Through this rejection of respectability, the “Dirtbag Left” has become an imagined community of white, male leftists who hold reactionary views on gender and race in the eyes of the existing left-liberal community. Despite the “Dirtbag Left” showing overwhelming support for Black Lives Matter or the Trans community, these perceptions remain common. The second half of this paper will examine how these misconceptions arose and their continuation is furthered to maintain hyper-individualistic respectability politics.
Comment responsabiliser les irresponsables?: Stéphanie Mayer (Université d'Ottawa)
Abstract: Les éthiques féministes du care prônent une conception relationnelle de la responsabilité. Les relations humaines demandent des pratiques de soins pour répondre aux besoins d’autrui. Il y a des conséquences à se défausser à ces responsabilités et Joan Tronto nomme ce phénomène : « irresponsabilité des privilégiés » (1993; 2013). Ce concept révèle les asymétries de pouvoir (ex. patriarcales, capitalistes, racistes) qui rendent possible l’irresponsabilité par rapport à ces pratiques en proximité avec la vulnérabilité des corps et qui assurent le cadre de la vie. Ce travail invisibilisé et dévalorisé est relégué aux femmes (dans le privé et le public) ou aux personnes moins privilégiées en sociétés. Ces actions irresponsables ont des conséquences qui doivent être contestées. La figure relationnelle étudiée sera le couple hétérosexuel en raison des injustices qui perdurent entre les partenaires et qui sont étroitement liées à ces responsabilités de care. L’intention générale sera d’esquisser une réponse à la question suivante : comment responsabiliser les irresponsables? Il faudra d’abord discuter des avantages du concept « d’irresponsabilité des privilégiés » (Tronto) pour aborder la question des couples. Ensuite, en puisant dans les travaux philosophiques et sociologiques sur la conscientisation politique, on envisagera différents moyens par lesquels il pourrait être possible de responsabiliser les irresponsables afin de mettre à mal ces irresponsabilités, les asymétries de pouvoir et leurs conséquences injustifiables. Enfin, une réflexion critique portera sur la charge politique de « responsabiliser les irresponsables » qui repose sur les dominé.es dans l’espoir de plus de justice et de liberté.
Is Permanent Ignorance Ever Necessary in Democratic Politics, Protection of Vulnerable Groups, and Constitutional Arrangements?: Lev Marder (Queen's University)
Abstract: From political ignorance afflicting the democratic electorate to white ignorance afflicting particular racial groups, ignorance has been identified in multiple disciplines as a problem— a temporary, albeit a deeply entrenched problem that knowledge could correct. It has also been identified as a historical practice that has protected indigenous knowledge from colonizers, a practice necessary for the establishment of trust, fair democratic decision-making that prevents from self-enrichment, and a necessary starting point for trial juries. In this paper, I show that the value of ignorance is difficult to defend based on the latter examples because they do not all require the same kind of ignorance. Using these examples, I distinguish between temporary and permanent ignorance to argue both (1) that an outright rejection or denigration of ignorance misses the mark when ignoring the distinction and (2) that a defense of permanent ignorance when necessary should not be used when temporary ignorance is sufficient. For example, if the cause rendering ignorance necessary to protect a vulnerable group disappears, the practice of ignorance becomes superfluous. The distinction developed in this paper should help scholars studying ignorance from democratic politics, critical race theory, and constitutional perspectives to defend the proper practice of ignorance when it serves desirable a/temporal ends.