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    Canadian Political Science Association
    2020 Annual Conference Programme

    Confronting Political Divides
    Hosted at Western University
    Tuesday, June 2 to Thursday, June 4, 2020
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    Presidential Address:
    Barbara Arneil, CPSA President

    Origins:
    Colonies and Statistics

    Location:
    Tuesday, June 2, 2020 | 05:00pm to 06:00pm
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    KEYNOTE SPEAKER:
    Ayelet Shachar
    The Shifting Border:
    Legal Cartographies of Migration
    and Mobility

    Location:
    June 04, 2020 | 01:30 to 03:00 pm
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    Keynote Speaker: Marc Hetherington
    Why Modern Elections
    Feel Like a Matter of
    Life and Death

    Location:
    Wednesday, June 3, 2020 | 03:45pm to 05:15pm
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    Plenary Panel
    Indigenous Politics and
    the Problem of Canadian
    Political Science

    Location: Arts & Humanities Building - AHB 1R40
    Tuesday, June 2, 2020 | 10:30am to 12:00pm

Political Theory



H10(b) - Speech and Listening

Date: Jun 3 | Time: 10:30am to 12:00pm | Location:

Chair/Président/Présidente : Stephanie Mayer (University of Ottawa)

Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Barbara Arneil (University of British Columbia)

Two Views of Virtue: Disentangling Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Ethics: Tina Rupcic (Concordia University)
Abstract: Can we find in Aristotle a useful model for ethical public speech? The literature now agrees that Aristotle’s efforts in the Rhetoric are directed at improving the teaching and practice of rhetoric. For Eugene Garver (1994) and other interpreters, improving rhetoric means making public speech ethical. They read the Rhetoric as an attempt at directing public speech in such a way as to align it, more or less, with the normative ideals described in the Nicomachean Ethics. If improving rhetoric requires an alignment with the virtues of the Ethics, this implies that Aristotle’s Rhetoric is of potentially limited use. Garver, who sees the Ethics and the Rhetoric as “coextensive,” makes precisely this point: he argues that Aristotle’s improved teaching about rhetoric is not applicable to our contemporary context because it is only workable in the polis. I maintain that there is much we can learn from Aristotle, but that doing so requires that we not assimilate the texts in question. My research compares Aristotle’s discussion of the virtues in the Rhetoric with the account offered in the Ethics in order to highlight the differences between the two treatments. I show why, for Aristotle, improving public speech requires a separate ethical model, one that looks not to the highest human good, but to the good of the political community. The Rhetoric is, in this respect, a highly pragmatic work and one that is therefore relevant to current discussions about how best to improve rhetorical practice.


Privilege and Responsibility: Confronting Power in the Deliberative System: Anna Drake (University of Waterloo)
Abstract: Deliberative democracy has always been centrally concerned with power. As it aims to meet an ideal standard of engagement, deliberative democracy requires people reason together with the expectation that everyone participates as political equals. Central to this are mutual respect and the need to ensure coercive power does not distort deliberations. Recently, there has been a re-examination of power in deliberative democracy (Bächtiger et al. 2018; Curato et al. 2019, Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019). This is, in part, due to the move to deliberative systems, which seeks substantive inclusion in a broader context by embracing activism (amongst other systems components). However, these discussions focus on power as domination, and aim to meet substantive inclusion by redistributing voice. The problem with this is twofold. First, there is little sustained analysis of power through the lens of oppression: if we accept Young’s argument that “power is a relation rather than a thing” (1990, 31) this response is fundamentally inadequate. Second, the emphasis on inclusion undermines activism that stands outside of and in opposition to dominant framings of power. I examine these interrelated problems. Drawing from Olson’s (2004, 88-89) critique of Young’s discussion of inclusion and social groups, which he examines in the context of the failure of white democracy, I highlight the role of privilege in deliberative democrats’ discussions of power, activism, and coercion. I revisit Young’s analysis of oppression to incorporate a critique of privilege and use this to highlight problems with power, inclusion, and equality in deliberative democracy.


What Can Public Opinion do for Political Theory?: Alexis Bibeau (University of Virginia)
Abstract: Recent years have witnessed the appearance of a debate about the role (if any) that political science ought to play in political theory. How can we go about doing political theory without engaging with the empirical world? The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical account of what public opinion – that is, mass public attitudes – can do for political theory. I argues that empirical researches on public opinion, considered as a mean to access certain truths about the social world, serve three purposes for political theory. First, public opinion ensures that judgments made in a reflective equilibrium setting are objective. This is a methodological argument based on the idea that public opinion method of aggregation of individual attitudes has the virtue of removing biases that may be induced by an individualistic deliberative method. Second, I argue that public opinion takes into account feasibility and acceptability issues crucial to the conduct of political theory and to the validity of political principles. The deliberative dimension of the public, democratic sphere ought to take into account what is feasible and what is considered acceptable by people who are actually impacted by political decisions. Third, I claim that public opinion offers a democratic justification to theoretical principles. This argument is based on the idea that political concepts, by virtue of being political, have a public nature that is distinct from ethical principles, for instance. I conclude by considering certain particular cases where public opinion serves political theory.




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